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BLACK SHEEP OVER IRAQ

THE 8TH FIGHTER SQUADRON IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

BY MSGT GREG HENNEMAN

49TH FIGHTER WING HISTORY OFFICE

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PREFACE

(U) For more than 60 years, the men and women of the Fighting 49ers have served at the forefront of combat operations. During World War II, the 49th Fighter Group recorded 678 aerial victories while fighting in every major campaign in the Pacific Theater. The 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing launched the first allied jet fighters of the Korean War and continued to fight until the 1953 ceasefire. In 1972, the 10,000 combat missions flown by the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing applied the pressure which helped bring an end to the Vietnam War.

(U) Operation Iraqi Freedom marks the latest chapter in the combat history of the 49th Fighter Wing. Armed with the F-117A *Nighthawk* "stealth" fighter, the deployed team of the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron unleashed the first strike of the war in a highly publicized decapitation mission against Iraqi leadership on 20 March 2003. Equally as important, pilots destroyed over 100 high value Iraqi targets. The F-117A directly contributed to one of the fastest invasions and victories over a foreign nation in the history of warfare.

(U) This study documents the role that the F-117A played in Operation Iraqi Freedom and includes all mission reports, before and after photographs of every target, and weapons system video. In addition to the information used in this study, the researcher should consult the List of Supporting Documents for additional documents which include all F-117A mission and intelligence briefings given during Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is the author's hope that the information gathered in this study will not only serve as an accurate and exhaustive record, but the lessons learned from this operation will be applied to future contingencies.

(U) While my name is on the cover of this study, this history could not have been accomplished without the help and support of many. Interviews served as the backbone of the historical analysis of this operation and I thank each person who granted their time and honesty—their names and stories make history a living document. Although some historians may question the use of long quotes in this study, it is the first-person accounts which best tell the fascinating stories behind the F-117A in Operation Iraqi Freedom. I also thank the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron's Intelligence Office, and especially Maj Ronald J. Keller, who not only tolerated my barrage of emails but assisted in collecting all of the supporting documentation included in this study. Most importantly, I thank my counterpart, TSgt Terri Berling, whose thoroughness in capturing information and incredible editorial capabilities made this study what it is. Thank you to all.

-gsh

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BLACK SHEEP OVER IRAQ: THE 8TH FIGHTER SQUADRON IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

A stealthy F-117 over Baghdad is one example of the nexus of intelligence, technology, and planning—they didn't know we were there until the bombs started to explode. We must enhance our ability to create such surprises in the future, although how we do so may require fundamental shifts in the systems we use.

"Building a Military for the 21st Century"
House and Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony.
October 2001

BACKGROUND

(U) Although the F-117A first put bombs-on-target during Operation Just Cause, the removal of General Manuel A. Noriega in Panama, it was over the skies of Baghdad in 1991 that the Air Force's first low observable, *stealth*, fighter gained public notoriety. During the war for the liberation of Kuwait, F-117As made up just 2.5 percent of the air forces, but destroyed nearly 40 percent of the targets. Moreover, images of precision attacks, such as Maj Greg Feest's opening strike against an Iraqi integrated operations center, played on global news networks. In 1999, the F-117As returned to combat as the first aircraft into Belgrade provided decisive airpower during the air war over Serbia: flying more than 500 combat missions in two and a half months.¹

(U) While the F-117A played an essential role in the aforementioned operations, they operated autonomously and with special requirements. For example, the *Nighthawks* always parked and conducted maintenance in closed shelters, while counterparts from other weapons systems operated outdoors in the searing desert heat of Kuwait or chilling rains of Italy. While flying, the F-117As usually had their own ingress and egress routes to the target area with their own dedicated air refueling. Coming out of Operation Allied Force, these differences resulted in the perception that the F-117A community was a

¹ (U) Combination of open source materials.

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group of "high maintenance assholes" who were "too difficult to use and too expensive to lose."²

(U) Thus, beginning around 2001, 49th Fighter Wing (FW) leadership dedicated itself to changing the stereotype and reputation of the F-117 community. From 2001 to 2004, the 49 FW participated in every available Red Flag exercise, often serving as mission commanders instead of an outside anomaly. The wing also participated in joint, combined, and multi-force exercises. These opportunities not only provided coordinated training, but served as a forum to teach the combat air forces about what low observable fighter aircraft could do for them, not just what others believed was expected of them to support the F-117A.³

(U) Maj S. Clinton Hinote explained the work that went into improving the capabilities and responsiveness of the F-117A:⁴

(U) We had a certain way that we had always done things in the F-117. Unfortunately, that way was not always going to be useful in fighting terrorism. So, we decided to try and do different things. Some of the things we did were to develop new procedures for hitting fleeting or time sensitive targets. We actually got fairly successful at it. It was hard work to figure out how we would get the information to the pilot, so he could maneuver the jet in the right way, without showing ourselves to the threat. We worked out those procedures and worked them until the day we started Iraqi Freedom.

(U) As a result of this pre-Iraqi Freedom training, Col Charles G. C. (Rich) Treadway, 49th Fighter Wing Vice Command and former Operations Group Commander, described the change in perception: "I believe the combat air forces now consider the F-117s to be integral to everything they are doing, easy to use, easy to talk to, very flexible, and willing to do anything with the parameters of us surviving the mission to help them out. We changed the reputation of the jet and its pilots." However, the real test of the F-117As integration within the greater Air Force would not come through a believed perception, but would be tested in combat.⁵

² Interview (S/DECL X1 and X4), MSgt G Henneman, 49FW/HO, with Col C Treadway, 49FW/CV, 1 Jul 04, (information used is U), SD 99.

³ *Ibid*

⁴ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

⁵ Interview (S/DECL X1 and X4), MSgt G Henneman, 49FW/HO, with Col C Treadway, 49FW/CV, 1 Jul 04, (information used is U), SD 99.

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A CALL TO ARMS

(U) Simultaneous attacks against New York City's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001 changed American military and political perceptions of terrorism. Terrorism could no longer be seen as a containable threat controlled merely through legal venues. Rather, American political leaders sought to take the fight to the terrorists, before further attacks could be perpetrated on American soil.⁶

(U) Encapsulating this vision in his 30 January 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush characterized Saddam Hussein's Iraq as part of the "Axis of Evil." One year after the attacks against America, on 12 September 2002, President Bush addressed the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and implored the organization to hold Iraq accountable for unaccounted weapons of mass destruction and readmit weapons inspectors. Over the next six months the United Nations passed its sixteenth resolution (UN Resolution 1441) in eleven years concerning Iraq and inspectors returned to Iraq. However, Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix continued to find Iraq in "material breach" of UN resolutions. On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN and made the case to the international community for continued pressure against Iraq--under the threat of war.⁷

(b)(1)

⁶ Timeline (U), "Operation Iraqi Freedom Chronology," *Airman*, June 2003, SD 101; Timeline (U), "Iraq Timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004," *Guardian Unlimited*, 2004, SD 102.

⁷ See Note Above.

⁸ Msg (S/DECL X4), ACC/CAT to I2AF/CC, et al, "OEF DEPORD 177B (U)," 120530Z Jan 03, filed as SD II-67, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

⁹ *Ibid.*

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(b)(1)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Ensuring the myriad of tasks needed to accomplish the deployment took place. the 49 FW's Installation Deployment Officer, Capt Anthony J. Mullinax, held a deployment concept briefing (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Less than a week after the aircraft deployment order, ACC issued an Air Tasking Order outlining the movement (b)(1)

(b)(1)

¹⁰ Msg (S/DECL X4), ACC/CAT to 12AF/CC, et al, "DEPOD 36C (U)," 232224Z Jan 03, filed as SD II-68, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

¹¹ Brfg (S/DECL X4), 49FW/IDO, "Operation Enduring Freedom (U)," 27 Jan 03, filed as SD II-77, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Rpt (FOUO), 49 FW, "DSOE Processing/Recap Report," 28 Jan 03, filed as SD II-78, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.; Notes (S/DECL X4), 49FW/BS, "Battlestaff Meeting Notes (U)," 28 Jan-5 Feb 03, filed as SD II-74, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

¹² Msg (S/DECL X4), ACC/AODX to 49FW/CC, "Coronet East 084 Air Tasking Order (U)," 181531Z Jan 03, filed as SD II-70, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Msg (S/DECL X4), ACC/AOS to 8FS/CC, "Coronet East 084 Air Tasking Order, Change 3 (U)," 101355Z Feb 03, filed as SD II-71, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Msg (S/DECL X4), ACC/AOS to 8FS/CC, "Coronet East 084 Air Tasking Order, Change 1 (U)," 022030Z Feb 03, filed as SD II-72, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Brfg (S/DECL X4), 8EFS, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, 20 Mar-3 Apr 03 (U)," n.d., filed as SD II-73, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Notes (S/DECL X4), 49FW/BS, "Battlestaff Meeting Notes (U)," 28 Jan-5 Feb 03, filed as SD II-74, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Slides (S/DECL X4), 49FW/BS, "Battle Staff Meeting Slides (U)," 23 Jan-5 Feb 03, filed as SD II-75, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Email (S/DECL X4), 49FW/CP to Lt Col J Pechiney, 49OSS/IN, "Aircraft SLIP," 2 Feb 03, filed as SD II-76, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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(FOUO) TABLE 1: DEPLOYED TAIL NUMBERS

TAIL NUMBER	DATE OF ARRIVAL
80-789	7 Feb 03
81-794	6 Feb 03
81-799	6 Feb 03
82-800	6 Feb 03
85-814	6 Feb 03
85-816	11 Feb 03
85-818	7 Feb 03
85-819	6 Feb 03
85-824	6 Feb 03
85-825	6 Feb 03
85-834	7 Feb 03
87-842	6 Feb 03

SOURCE: Chart (FOUO), 49OSS, "Weekly Equipment Utilization and Maintenance Schedule," 16 Feb 03, filed as SD II-69, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

(U) Reflecting on the deployment from Holloman AFB, one pilot wrote:¹³

(U) The night we deployed our aircraft, all of us were overwhelmed by those who were there to see us off. The support from our sister squadron was unparalleled. As their entire squadron and their maintenance counterpart worked 24 hours a day for three straight days to provide us with the best F-117As to take into the impending battle, we were able to focus our thoughts on our families and loved ones in preparation for our call to duty. As both my crew chiefs helped me strap into their aircraft as I prepared to take it to war, A1C Thomas Cook wished me "Good luck, sir" and SSgt Paul Wyatt said "Be safe, sir and hurry back. Now go make history." Their comments and actions conveyed their pride in what they do. And I was just as proud of them.

(U) My first sight as I taxied out of the hangar was that of an entire row of maintenance troops lined up in formation along the canyon taxiway. As I taxied by, they all saluted in unison and beamed with pride. The highest rank I saw out there was Staff Sergeant. I taxied by knowing I was sitting in the best product they had to offer. Our launch that night was first class.

(U) Further down the canyon, our spouses and families lined the left side of the taxiway. Amidst the group of proud waves and blowing kisses, all of us focused on those who mean the most to us. Intently searching to make that one last eye contact that would have to last each of us for months. Emotions ran high on both sides of the cockpit glass.

¹³ Ltr (U), Cruiser, "A fighter pilot's goodbye," Desert Eagle, 2 Apr 03, filed as SD II-79, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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(U) The next salute was from a "Patton-esque" Colonel Hunt, standing all alone at attention in front of his staff car. As we left the lit canyon area, his long proud unwavering salute sent us off to battle as if to say "Do well men, and return home safe".

(U) Rounding the corner to the runway, we taxied by Colonel Treadway and Colonel Papp and their wives. Both saluted with almost a fatherly look that conveyed the message of "go forth and do what you are trained to do" mixed with a look of "I would do anything to be there with you". The four of them followed us to the runway, where Col Treadway spoke to each pilot individually through the headset, personally launching us on our journey.

(U) As we took the runway and blasted off into the night, I saw the flash of the cameras and felt the weight of the stares of all the friends and families gathered there to see us off into the darkness. I could sense our loved one's thoughts and prayers as we disappeared from sight. It is those thoughts and prayers that I ask from all of you now.

(U) In contrast to the emotions of a deploying pilot were the sentiments of a former F-117A pilot serving as an Air Force Recruiting Squadron Commander. In a series of motivational messages to his troops, he wrote the email below after the first attack on Baghdad.¹⁴

(U) I'm feeling a bit odd and queer, kinda strange today...a little out of sorts...can't nail it down, the emotions and different sort of anxiety within...when I watched the news late last night and listened to reports of "Back to Baghdad" with first wave of cruise missiles and F-117As...hum...you know, the two major wars since Vietnam, Desert Storm and Allied Force, I was at the tip of the tip of the operational push – I was in an F-117A on the first night of Desert Storm in Iraq and I was in the last wave the last night of Desert Storm – I was in an F-117A the first wave the first night of Allied Force...if I was in the F-117A program right now I'd have been among those F-117As last night; yet, I could not be more proud to be where I am now and doing what I'm doing now...part of my heart and spirit is with those phenomenal professional warfighters in the Middle East, right there with them on the flight line, in the cockpit, in the life support shop, in the "war room," in the command post, in the intel shop, targeting shop, planning cell...taking care of everyone, looking over everything, making sure all is well; still, ALL of me is here with all of you and that's ok – they'll be all right over there...they're gunna lick 'em and they're gonna do it right. And don't forget where they all came from....

¹⁴ Email (U), Lt Col D Zelko to 368RCS All, "update to an Early Thanks." 20 Mar 03, filed as SD II-80, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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DECAPITATION STRIKE

(U) As the sun began to rise over Baghdad at 0530L on 20 March 2003, Lt Col Dave Toomey and Maj Mark Hoehn released two EGBU-27s each from their F-117As on a bunker at Dora Farms, a compound near the Tigris River. Intelligence led American military leadership to believe they had discovered the hiding place of Saddam Hussein. With only four hours notice from mission preparation to bombs-on-target, the F-117As of the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron launched the opening shot of Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹⁵

(U) Major Hinote served a key role in the operational planning of the F-117As as the liaison officer to the Combined Air Forces Component Commander at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Although Major Hinote coordinated and reviewed all of the F-117A missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom, his expertise was particularly called upon for the 20 March 2003 decapitation strike. He reflected:¹⁶

(U) I was in the cafeteria eating cookies. We had a wonderful baker that could make the best chocolate chip cookies. My day was kind of winding down. I went into the cafeteria and was watching the news. I was very interested in what was going on. One of my friends from targeting came in and said, they need you on the floor right away. I thought: oh no. We went back to the main headquarters building and we went to the combat operations floor, straight to the time sensitive targeting cell.

(U) I walked in, looked at the computer screen, and the number one target said "Possible location of Saddam." I thought okay, this may be something of interest to everybody. We went ahead, looked at the situation, and the situation was such that we thought there was a bunker there at this place called Dora Farms. The F-117 had the penetrating bombs; that was going to be the F-117's job. It made sense, because the F-117 had the ability to penetrate the Iraqi defenses. We knew we were going to probably use cruise missiles to be able to take out some of the surface buildings, just to make sure the target was not in the other buildings.

(U) We had to start to get the unit ready. One of my friends called up, got them ready, and I transmitted as much of the information as I could at the time. Some of the information about the location, the coordinates we would want the bombs to fall on. We told them to get ready as quick as you can. General Moseley may sign the execute order within an hour. That was about 0130 in the morning, local time, Baghdad time.

¹⁵ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC, "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

¹⁶ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

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(U) After we got the unit on alert, got them working on loading up the weapons and getting the pilots ready to go. General Moseley called me up to his office. I'll never forget what he said. he looked at me and said. "Here is the answer that we owe the President: can we do this mission, and if so what is the risk?" I can just remember for a split second thinking: wow, this is really going to happen. My answer, as best as I could get it out, because I was quite nervous, the best that I could say to him: "Sir, we can do this, but I think the risk is going to be pretty high."

(U) Quite frankly, General Moseley played a huge role in determining how we were going to attack. A great job as an operational commander, laying out the guidelines for the aircrew and we came up with a great plan. I was lucky just to be in the room, giving him some advice in what we could do with the F-117. After we discussed that, I remember calling up somebody, and I learned later he was talking with General Myers in the situation room. He said, "Sir, we feel like we can do this. The risk is probably going to be high." Everyone was of the mindset that we were going to press with this.

(U) At the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron in Qatar, Colonel Toomey and his group condensed a normal twelve hours of mission planning into two hours. Colonel Toomey stated:¹⁷

(U) It takes about two hours to fly from Al Udeid to Baghdad, so that meant we had to have the airplanes in the air at 0330 in the morning. It was now about quarter to two in the morning and we hadn't even started mission plan, yet. For the F-117, we typically planned, it took us, around 12 hours is what we like to plan a whole day. We had about an hour to plan it all out. So we had a quick huddle with maintenance folks, mission planning folks, our intel folks, our weapons folks, and we said, "O.K., here's all the things that we need to do to get these jets off the ground by 0330 in the morning." When you looked at the threat map, it was a pretty dense threat array on the order of 50 surface-to-air missiles and over 200 AAA sites that surrounded the area.

(U) [At] about probably 3:10 in the morning, the light truck comes flying down the flight line, and the guys jump out with the mission planning materials, they stick those little data transfer modules into the bomb, they come up the ladder and they say, "O.K., here's your photo, here's your route, and here's your mission planning materials, see ya." Close the canopy, start up the jets, plug in the mission planning materials . . .

¹⁷ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC, "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

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(U) Normally, you get a mission route that takes you all the way from beginning to end, so you know where you are going. In this case, we had a route that took us from Al Udeid to Kuwait and then ended there, and then we had a route that took you from about 40 miles out of Baghdad, and back out again and ended there. They weren't connected and there was nothing in between, so you basically get to create, you go find your tanker, go find your first point and come back out. So there is a little bit of airmanship involved to kind of keep all that straight.

(U) Back at Combined Air Operations Center, Major Hinote continued to tie together the coordination needed to make the strike a success:¹⁸

(U) I know personally of National Guardsmen, Reserves, Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps people who were all involved in that strike. You wouldn't think that we could all work together so well if you listen to all the papers about how we always fight. Quite honestly, it was a great team effort to make that first strike happen. We honestly thought, maybe it would shorten the war. We wanted to save lives and we thought this was the way to start. I'm sure that is what the president was thinking when he gave the execute order that came down about an hour later. General Moseley looked at me and said "We are going to go, let them know."

(U) Colonel Toomey described the flight from Qatar to Baghdad:¹⁹

(U) We launched the jets around 3:30 in the morning. We didn't tell anybody what we were doing, we didn't talk to anybody, we took off, and we flew "stealthed up" all the way up to Kuwait. When we got on radio in Kuwait, we said, "This is Ram One, we are looking for a tanker," and they said, "Ram One, you are our number one priority mission," and they gave us a tanker and it happened to be a KC-135. In the meantime, we were still getting approval for the time over target of 0530, they came back and said "you are approved for no later than 5:30 TOT." Sunrise in Baghdad was 6:03, so it is starting to get light out, now, which is not conducive to flying F-117s over Iraq. We got on the tanker, and there were two F-16Cs on the tanker, and we were getting our gas and they asked us, "Does anybody know where this mission is going?" All they knew was to be there - no one told them where they were going. So I got them on a secure radio, and I said, "O.K., here is the plan that I'm going to push in from, here are my target coordinates, here's where we are coming out and here is the time," and we gave it to them, and you could see the little question marks and they finally realized where it is that we are going. We had the same thing

¹⁸ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

¹⁹ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC, "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

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happen when we had three EA-6B jammers come in. And they said the same thing: "Does anybody know exactly . . .," and we gave them, once again, "here's the push points, here's the time over target, here's the target coordinates, and we're going." As it was, we had to take the tanker and everybody into Iraq because we were running out of time, so we took the tanker and the whole gaggle into Iraq. Then, we jumped off the tanker, re-stealthed up the F-117s, the F-16s and the EA-6s left, and the tanker turned around and went home. We were the seven airplanes in Iraq.

(U) With the F-117As on the route to the target, the planners at the combined air operations center could do little but wait. Major Hinote remembered:²⁰

(U) After they got their gas and pushed north, we knew where they were. I went up into the battle cab, where General Moseley supervises operations; we were just sitting around the table. That was lonely at the time, there was nothing more we could do. They were going to sink or swim on their own. At this point we had done everything we could. I remember being very nervous and anxious. By that time, I knew the pilots that were flying. I knew they were two pilots that lived near me. I knew their wives; I knew their kids. I just had this picture in my mind of the worst thing that could happen and [having to] let them know their husbands weren't coming home. I was nervous and so was everyone else around me. I can remember that General Moseley sensed the nervousness in the room. He came up to me and said: "Don't worry, they are going to make it, you watch." That is all he needed to say. It really helped me.

(U) Colonel Toomey described the actual placing of the bombs-on-target:²¹

(U) The attack, itself, took us to the east and west borders of Iraq and the city of Baghdad, then we criss-crossed over the target, came back out, both airplanes hit the target: we put four 2,000 pound bombs on an underground bunker, and then about three minutes later, somewhere on the order of 40 tomahawk cruise missiles came in and destroyed everything above ground. We came over the target at 5:30, it was relatively light out. You could pretty much see the ground. Luckily, there was a low deck of clouds that obscured the city. That was the good news for us because they couldn't see up through the clouds. The bad news would have been, a year ago, when we didn't have these enhanced GBU-27s, we would not have been able to drop, because we couldn't see the target. And, therefore, we couldn't lazy the bomb in. This time we could drop the satellite bombs through the weather, so we dropped all four through the weather on that

²⁰ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

²¹ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC, "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

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target and egressed back out. And we were probably the only ones in Iraq coming back out – everybody else had already left.

(U) With the F-117As completing their mission, Major Hlinote and others stood by waiting for the news:²²

(U) We tried to figure out which TV station would carry the bomb blast first. We had TVs in the battle cab lining the walls and we tuned those to the different news stations we could pick up. I distinctly remember, the time over target was 0530L Baghdad time, which was around 2130L in the US, which was right on Larry King for CNN and they went to a commercial. We were watching SkyNews from Britain. They were the first to say there was a big explosion in southern Baghdad. That is how we knew they made it through and had gotten the bombs off. At least we knew the bombs had exploded. We didn't know where. They did a great job of getting in and getting out.

(U) Colonel Toomey described the return to Qatar:²³

(U) We landed, taxied back in, there were two security cops down at the side of the runway, saluting me, and I thought that was kind of hot. I pull around the corner in the sunshelters, because you couldn't see in there, they were bermed by sand, and there was just a sea of desert BDUs and people screaming and yelling. And we pulled these two jets in, lowered the weapons bays, and all the bombs are gone. That was it. We made it back home and that was the first shot of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

(U) This high profile first night strike marked the first-ever operational employment of EGBU-27s by the F-117A. In addition to using the munitions for the first time against communication nodes and command bunkers in Baghdad, the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron made the first-ever operational dual door and dual target delivery with the EGBU-27. Colonel Toomey explained:²⁴

(U) One of the interesting things about this deployment was a new weapon that came on-line called the enhanced GBU-27, the EGBU-27. It is a satellite guided bomb, as well as a laser guided bomb, and that's the first time it was employed off of the F-117. Up until that point, we had never dropped an EGBU-27 and we did not even have all the technical orders for EGBU-27s. We did not have approval to drop two of them at one time, not even to mention we did not have approval to drop two on one target, simultaneously, which is what we needed to do. So that same day, earlier, the CTF [Combined Test Force] test folks, out in Palmdale, flew a jet out

²² Interview (U), Lt Col C Hlinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

²³ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC. "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

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to Utah and dropped two of these things, and called us up and said, "Yeah, it worked," and we said, "Good." We didn't know that night we were going to go and drop four of them. So, we just [received] approval that day, it was actually a neat work up between the 49th Fighter Wing, the Test Detachment that is here [at Holloman AFB] that does the testing that is assigned to Eglin, and the CTF which does the developmental work for us. A lot of things happened at the right time to make that happen.

COMBAT MISSIONS

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(U) The F-117As struck a variety of targets during the 15 days of precision attacks. Major Hinote provided an example of the effect of the F-117A strikes:²⁶

(U) We had targeted a communications node, which is one of the things we wanted to do [in order to] cut the regime off from forces outside of Baghdad. We didn't want them to be able to command their forces or even give them any hope if they were still alive. We wanted to cut that connection. So, one of the things we did was to cut off the phone lines. There was one night the F-117s targeted a phone switch yard, a building with a bunch of switches. The next day I watched the news reports when a reporter went to that switch building and documented how much damage had been done. It looked mangled, it looked horrible. But, next door was unhurt. All of the Iraqis came out to look at the damage. They would not have done that if they thought we were raining bombs all over Baghdad. They knew we weren't targeting them and they knew they'd be safe even to come all the way up to the building and look at it. That made me feel really good that maybe we are getting our point across, that we are not trying to hit the civilians or the Iraqi population. Our quarrel was not with them our quarrel was with the Iraqi leadership and they will not be there very much longer.

²⁵ Extract (S/NF/DECL X4), 8FS, [OIF Lessons Learned (U)] n.d., filed as SD II-81, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

²⁶ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

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(U) Colonel Toomey described the flexibility of the F-117As in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability demonstrated a fundamental shift [see the quote at the top of page four] in how the F-117A was employed in combat.²⁷

(U) We flew numerous missions throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the other things we did for the first time: we put airplanes on 30 minute alert, with pilots briefed up, all wearing their gear and ready to go and then we got phone calls and then we launched the jets and we hit targets. We also had guys do time-critical targeting, time-sensitive targeting where they were re-tasked in the air, they were flying up to Baghdad thinking they were going to hit one target and they got a call saying, "Hey, you're going to hit this other target." And they got re-rolled in air - another big one for us.

(U) Table 2 provides a summary of the daily combat missions flown by the 8th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron. Further analyses and summaries are provided in Appendices A through D at the end of this study.

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²⁷ Interview (U), TSgt T Berling, 49FW/HO, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC, "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SD 98.

²⁸ Rpt (S/REL REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [RAMM 01 MISREP (U)], 200638Z MAR03, SD 001; Rpt (S/REL REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [RAMM 02 MISREP (U)], 200615ZMAR03, SD 002.

²⁹ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [BIMBO 41 MISREP (U)] 212236ZMAR03, SD 003; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [BIMBO 42 MISREP (U)] 210044Z MAR 03, SD 004; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [NODDER 43 MISREP (U)] 212245Z MAR

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03, SD 005; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [NODDER 44 MISREP (U)] 212051Z MAR 03, SD 006; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [ZELDA 45 MISREP (U)] 212052Z MAR 03, SD 007; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [MINX 47 MISREP (U)] 210015Z MAR 03, SD 008; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [MINX 48 MISREP (U)] 212030Z MAR 03, SD 009; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [RAMADA 51 MISREP (U)] 210006Z MAR 03, SD 010.

³⁰ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ICEAGE 41 MISREP (U)] 221740Z MAR 03, SD 011; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ICEAGE 42 MISREP (U)] 222015Z MAR 03, SD 012; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ICEAGE 42 INTREP MISREP (U)] 222314Z MAR 03, SD 013; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 43 MISREP (U)] 222434Z MAR 03, SD 014; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 44 MISREP (U)] 221930Z MAR 03, SD 015; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ICEAGE 45 MISREP (U)] 221740Z MAR 03, SD 016; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ICEAGE 46 MISREP (U)] 222045Z MAR 03, SD 017; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 47 MISREP (U)] 222030Z MAR 03, SD 018; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 48 MISREP (U)] 222035Z MAR 03, SD 019; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 47 INTREP MISREP (U)] 230020Z MAR 03, SD 020; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 48 INTREP MISREP (U)] 230045Z MAR 03, SD 021.

³¹ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HOIST 41 MISREP (U)] 232345Z MAR 03, SD 022; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HOIST 42 MISREP (U)] 230610Z MAR 03, SD 023; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HOIST 51 MISREP (U)] 230345Z MAR 03, SD 024; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HOIST 52 MISREP (U)] 230620Z MAR 03, SD 025; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ORGAN 43 MISREP (U)] 230620Z MAR 03, SD 026; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ORGAN 44 MISREP (U)] 230440Z MAR 03, SD 027; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ORGAN 53 MISREP (U)] 230600Z MAR 03, SD 028; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [ORGAN 54 MISREP (U)] 230650Z MAR 03, SD 029;

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³² Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WHISK 45 MISREP (U)] 240130Z MAR 03.
SD 030; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WHISK 46 MISREP (U)] 240100Z MAR 03.
SD 031; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WHISK 47 MISREP (U)] 232326Z MAR 03.
SD 032; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WHISK 48 MISREP (U)] 230031Z MAR 03.
SD 033; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POSSE 41 MISREP (U)] 240311Z MAR 03.
SD 034; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POSSE 42 MISREP (U)] 240326Z MAR 03.
SD 035; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POSSE 43 MISREP (U)] 240330Z MAR 03.
SD 036; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POSSE 44 MISREP (U)] 240530Z MAR 03.
SD 037.

³³ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 45 MISREP (U)] 250430Z MAR 03.
SD 038; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 46 MISREP (U)] 250354Z MAR 03.
SD 039; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 47 MISREP (U)] 25030354Z MAR
03. SD 040; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 48 MISREP (U)] 240530Z MAR
03. SD 041; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 41 MISREP (U)] 241220Z MAR
03. SD 042; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 42 MISREP (U)] 242355Z MAR
03. SD 043; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HEIST 43 MISREP (U)] 250008Z MAR

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03, SD 044: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HIEIST 44 MISREP (U)] 241220Z MAR 03, SD 045.

³⁴ Spreadsheet (S/DECL X4), 8 FS/IN, "Mission Tracker (U)," 24 Jul 03, SD 103

³⁵ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [SHINER 43 MISREP (U)] 262225Z MAR

03, SD 046: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [SHINER 44 MISREP (U)] 270210Z MAR

03, SD 047: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TEMPER 45 MISREP (U)] 270210Z

MAR 03, SD 048: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TEMPER 46 MISREP (U)]

270215Z MAR 03, SD 049.

³⁶ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WALDO 51 MISREP (U)] 280340Z MAR

03, SD 050: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WALDO 52 MISREP (U)] 280405Z MAR

03, SD 051.

³⁷ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TEMPER 41 MISREP (U)] 282151Z MAR

03, SD 052: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TEMPER 42 MISREP (U)] 282145Z

MAR 03, SD 053: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [SHINER 43 MISREP (U)] 290012Z

MAR 03, SD 054: Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [SHINER 44 MISREP (U)] 282201Z

MAR 03, SD 055.

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³⁸ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GIGOLO 41 MISREP (U)] 300030Z MAR 03, SD 056; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GIGOLO 42 MISREP (U)] 300030Z MAR 03, SD 057; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [DRAMA 43 MISREP (U)] 292145Z MAR 03, SD 058; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [DRAMA 44 MISREP (U)] 290050Z MAR 03, SD 059; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GIGOLO 45 MISREP (U)] 300100Z MAR 03, SD 060; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GIGOLO 46 MISREP (U)] 300030Z MAR 03, SD 061.

³⁹ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WALDO 45 MISREP (U)] 310320Z MAR 03, SD 062; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [WALDO 46 MISREP (U)] 310335Z MAR 03, SD 063; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 41 MISREP (U)] 311159Z MAR 03, SD 064; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 42 MISREP (U)] 302306Z MAR 03, SD 065; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 43 MISREP (U)] 302345Z MAR 03, SD 066; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 44 MISREP (U)] 302335Z MAR 03, SD 067; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 47 MISREP (U)] 302300Z MAR 03, SD 068; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 48 MISREP (U)] 302340Z MAR 03, SD 069; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 51 MISREP (U)] 302315Z MAR 03, SD 070; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 52 MISREP (U)] 302350Z MAR 03, SD 071.

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⁴⁰ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 41 MISREP (U)] 312300Z MAR 03, SD 072; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 42 MISREP (U)] 312309Z MAR 03, SD 073; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 45 MISREP (U)] 312320Z MAR 03, SD 074; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [GOBLIN 46 MISREP (U)] 312315Z MAR 03, SD 075; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TYRANT 43 MISREP (U)] 310258Z MAR 03, SD 076; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TYRANT 44 MISREP (U)] 010230Z MAR 03, SD 077; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TYRANT 47 MISREP (U)] 31 MAR 03, SD 078; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TYRANT 48 MISREP (U)] 010026Z MAR 03, SD 079.

⁴¹ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [JAYSEE 45 MISREP (U)] 020300Z APR 03, SD 080; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [JAYSEE 46 MISREP (U)] 020315Z APR 03, SD 081; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 41 MISREP (U)] 020300Z APR 03, SD 082; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 42 MISREP (U)] 023300Z APR 03, SD 083.

⁴² Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 41 MISREP (U)] 022030Z APR 03, SD 084; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 41 2 MISREP (U)] 022200Z APR 03, SD 085; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 42 MISREP (U)] 022015Z APR

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(U) Looking back on Operation Iraqi Freedom, a sandstorm on 24 March 2003 served as one of the turning points of the initial combat phase. While this storm eliminated visibility and brought Iraqi forces to a halt, allied forces used global positioning system (GPS) weapons, such as the EGBU-27, to strike known enemy positions. Major Hinote stated:⁴⁴

(U) I think the sandstorms probably hurt them more than they did us. Although at the time you heard all of these horrible reports that we were stopping, the air war is going terrible, the ground war has completely come to a halt. Generally, we used the sandstorm because we have GPS weapons and they don't. We were able to drop those GPS weapons through the sandstorm to effect things on the ground and of course they did not have the same ability to do that to us. We hit them a lot during that sandstorm and I am very glad I was not an Iraqi republican guard member on the ground underneath those GPS weapons. You would have never heard them, you would have never seen them, and all of sudden you'd see a huge explosion and you wouldn't know what hit you. The sandstorm, in some ways, was a blessing for us because we were able to use that and go directly after the Iraqis.

03, SD 086; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 42_2 MISREP (U)] 022145Z APR 03, SD 087; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 43 MISREP (U)] 021930Z APR 03, SD 088; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 43_2 MISREP (U)] 022155Z APR 03, SD 089; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 44 MISREP (U)] 021940Z APR 03, SD 090; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [VARDE 47 MISREP (U)] 022200Z APR 03, SD 091; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [VARDE 48 MISREP (U)] 022140Z APR 03, SD 092.

⁴³ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 41 MISREP (U)] 032116Z APR 03, SD 093; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [TRUTH 42 MISREP (U)] 032200Z APR 03, SD 094; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 43 MISREP (U)] 032015Z APR 03, SD 095; Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 44 MISREP (U)] 032100Z APR 03, SD 096.

⁴⁴ Interview (U), Lt Col C Hinote, 7 Sep 04, SD 97.

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MAINTENANCE

(U) Making the operational mission possible, the 49th Maintenance Group deployed a team of 105 Airmen in a range of specialties from avionics to crew chiefs to weapons specialists. The advanced echelon (ADVON) team left Holloman AFB on 29 January, followed by the main body on 31 January, and the ESTA on 3 February. However, the ESTA crew did not have a dedicated aircraft and were literally stranded at Moron until Captain Mullinax was able to get a C-17 diverted within Spain, from Rota to Moron. The lack of a dedicated ESTA could have become a large problem if an F-117A diverted for maintenance trouble half-way to the AOR.⁴⁵

(U) Another overall problem centered on not bringing enough or the appropriate parts to Qatar for use in maintenance operations. Not only were the items in the War Reserve Supply Kit (WRSK) insufficient for sustained combat operations, but getting parts into the theater took between seven and 10 days. In one instance it took 28 days to get a part. 1Lt Jose R. Martinez recommended that before deployment "personnel from LRS, AMXS and MXS need to sit down and figure out the problems for a particular AOR."⁴⁶

(U) This deployment marked the first time that F-117As were not maintained in closed shelters during home station or combat operations. Instead, they parked under metal-roofed sunshades. This resulted in extra maintenance hours on the F-117 windscreens and lower fuselage during Operation Iraqi Freedom to ensure the low observable characteristics of the F-117. Over the longer term, the penetration of blowing sand, dirt, and sunlight into the radar absorbent material (RAM) could have impaired operations if they went on for a longer period. In fact, even a year after returning to Holloman AFB, some F-117As still had issues with sand in the RAM from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lieutenant Martinez noted that the storage of F-117As needs to be clearly established in writing, so the host base can be directed to find hangar space. However, Colonel Toomey noted that the use of the shelters "Showed our flexibility and gave us more opportunity, based on what was available at the airfield." The total effort of the maintenance team is reflected in the mission capability statistics shown in Table 3.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Memo (U), 49AMXS/MXAA to 49AMXS/CC, "Trip Report for Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom," 2 Jul 03, filed as SD II-83, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

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(U) TABLE 3: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM MAINTENANCE STATISTICS

	FEB	MAR	APR	TOTAL
SORTIES FLOWN	151	201	66	418
HOURS FLOWN	404.4	604.2	355.7	1364.3
ACC PROG SORTIE UTE RT	14.4	14.4	14.4	14.4
ACT SORTIE UTE RATE	12.6	16.8	5.5	1.9
SORTIES SCHEDULED	164	203	66	433
POSSESSED HOURS	8064.0	8928.0	6048.0	23040.0
MC HOURS	6161.1	6995.6	5566.1	18722.8
MC RATE	76.4	78.4	92.0	81.3
FMC HOURS	6161.1	7108.5	5566.1	18835.7
FMC RATE	76.4	79.6	92.0	81.8
TNMCM HOURS	789.3	1192.2	152.9	2134.4
TNMCM RATE	9.8	13.4	2.5	9.3
TNMCS HOURS	1113.6	1159.2	339.1	2611.9
TNMCS RATE	13.8	13.0	5.6	11.3
NMCB HOURS	0.0	419.0	44.8	463.8
NMCB RATE	0.0	4.7	0.7	2.0
TOTAL CANNES	0	8	1	9
CANN RATE	0.0	4.0	1.5	2.2
BREAKS	7	25	2	34
BREAK RATE	4.6	12.4	3.0	8.1
AIR ABORTS	0	0	0	0
AIR ABORT RATE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GROUND ABORTS	12	11	2	25
GROUND ABORT RATE	7.4	5.2	2.9	5.6
TOTAL ABORT RATE	7.4	5.2	2.9	5.6
REPEATS	0	1	0	1
RECURS	1	7	1	9
REPEAT/RECUR RATE	2.4	8.5	9.1	6.8

SOURCE: Spreadsheet (U), 49OSS/OSOS, [Deployed Statistics] n.d., filed as SD II-84, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

(U) Another potential long-term issue centered on the number of maintenance troops deployed. Although the amount sent in a reduced UTC worked for this operation, it may not have for a longer period. Local policies mandated 12-hour shifts/seven days a week. Coupled with a "light and lean" UTC, emergency leaves, additional detail taskings, and illnesses, the F-117A maintenance operation had little flexibility. This proved especially true for some shops that only had one individual from a specific specialty.⁴⁸

(U) Several individual efforts contributed to the successful support of the F-117A combat operations. As an example, deployed Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)

⁴⁸ Memo (U), 49AMXS/MXAA to 49AMXS/CC, "Trip Report for Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom," 2 Jul 03, filed as SD II-83, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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technicians troubleshoot and identified a tripped fault reset problem on the PD501 air-conditioner. Capt Danny P. Maheux served as the deployed Munitions Flight Commander and managed over eight million pounds of munitions valued at more than \$1 billion. Survival equipment specialists such as TSgt Billy Mayfield and SrA Brett Bernhardt of the 49th Maintenance Squadron inspected and repacked 378 drag chutes, 99 of which were used in combat sorties.⁴⁹

ASSESSMENT

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ Overall, the F-117's performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom was assessed by wing and squadron leadership as "extremely successful." (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ Improvements in the F-117A mission planning process over the last four years resulted in a smaller deployment. Secure communications between Holloman AFB and Al Udeid allowed the wing to conduct Reachback mission planning from home station and not have to deploy as many people or as much equipment. (b)(1)

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⁴⁹ Rpt (U), 49AMXS, "OIF/OEF Record of Significant Accomplishment," n.d., filed as SD II-85, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Rpt (U), 49MXS, "OIF/OEF Record of Significant Accomplishment: Yeggy, Buchanan, Archer, and Saleem" n.d., filed as SD II-86, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Rpt (U), 49MXS, "OIF/OEF Record of Significant Accomplishment: Maheux" n.d., filed as SD II-87, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist; Rpt (U), 49MXMF, "OIF/OEF Record of Significant Accomplishment" n.d., filed as SD II-88, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

⁵⁰ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8 FS, [OIF Lessons Learned] n.d., filed as SD II-81, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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⁵¹ See Note 50; Brfg (S/DECL X4), 8EFS, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, 20 Mar-3 Apr 03," n.d., filed as SD II-72, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.


⁵² Brfg (S/DECL X4), 8EFS, "Operation Iraqi Freedom, 20 Mar-3 Apr 03," n.d., filed as SD II-72, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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(U) CHART 1: WEAPONS DROPPED



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⁵³ Rpt (S/DECL X1), ACC/DRY, "Mission Effectiveness Final Analysis: Air Force Surface to Air Missiles in Operation Iraqi Freedom." 8 Jan 04, SD 100.

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⁵⁴ Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8 FS, [OIF Lessons Learned] n.d., filed as SD II-81, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Interview (S/DECL X1 and X4), MSgt G Henneman, 49FW/HO, with Col C Treadway, 49FW/CV, 1 Jul 04, (information used is U), SD 99.

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(U) Our very smart majors had to convince Air Force leadership that it was only the result of extraordinary luck and valorous skill on the part of many of our pilots, in some of the worst weather, on some of the worst nights, that we had not had wrecks with a tanker—that we had not had mid-air collisions and not lost jets for the simple fact that we could have run into the tanker. Refueling on the tanker at night is the hardest thing this airplane did. We also found a way to modify the cockpits in a very cost friendly manner. It wasn't going to be millions of dollars per airplane to modify the cockpit to be able to use night vision capability. We did it, we got it! The squadrons are up and functioning. That is something that has made us more viable.

(U) Colonel Treadway explained additional lessons learned:⁵⁸

(U) This is also the first time that we deployed under the AEF lead wing concept, where, in this case, Seymour Johnson's leadership took over the base and then Holloman plugged into their leadership. So, where as in the past, you might have sent the ops [operations] group commander or the maintenance group commander or even the wing commander from Holloman with the F-117s, in this case, we sent the squadron commander as the highest ranking individual. Then we all plugged into the lead wing's leadership. There were some challenges with that, because you're trying to work with this agency that is not familiar with your airplane and the F-117 has some unique requirements. Just access to the area, for example, the new maintenance group first shirt and chief, they want to go in and see the airplanes. Well, you have to have clearance to get in and see the airplanes. Little things like that. But, for the most part, that worked out all right.

(U) Other things, I think flexibility is probably the biggest one. You know, we always say the key to airpower is flexibility, but I think the key to the F-117 staying a viable platform is flexibility of keeping airplanes outside, willing to accept higher risk and fly short notice mission, things like that, willing to put airplanes on alert, willing to accept being re-rolled in the air, and those kinds of things are a lot of things we did, tactically, that in the past, we did not do – we tried to do this time, as long as the risk made sense. And, I think it worked out beautifully.

⁵⁸ Interview (S/DECL X1 and X4), MSgt G Henneman, 49FW/HO, with Col C Treadway, 49FW/CV, 1 Jul 04, (information used is U), SD 99.

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(U) Colonel Toomey provided an overall assessment of the future of the F-117A.⁵⁹

(U) We are constantly evolving our capabilities to be of more use. We are changing right now to be a better weapon in the war on terrorism. I am very excited about what the F-117 is doing, how we are changing, to answer the president's call as we did the first night of Iraqi Freedom. We are going to be a better aircraft in the next war than we were in this war. We are going to have better pilots, better training, and a better aircraft as far as capabilities go. I think we are going to have better weapons and I am really excited about all of it.

REDEPLOYMENT

(U) After completing their mission, the deployed F-117A team returned home during the second and third weeks of April 2003. Making for a very special homecoming, three Team Holloman members held their newborn babies for the first time when they returned home. After two and a half months of pictures via email, Capt. Alex Jernigan,



(U) TSgt Vest holds his baby for the first time.

Tech. Sgt. Joseph Vest and Senior Airman Christopher Osterholm, were introduced to their newborns. Captain Jernigan stated that while deployed he had new pictures of his son and family waiting for him each day at work, and that seeing his son for the first time was very exciting. According to Sergeant Vest the moment he held his newborn was a very special moment and nothing could've prepared him for the first time. The newest dad of the group, Osterholm, stated he was overjoyed when he learned of his daughter's birth and that words couldn't describe the way he felt when he first held her.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Interview (U). TSgt T Berling, 49FW/110, with Lt Col D Toomey, 8FS/CC. "Interview with Col Toomey," 7 Aug 03, SI2 98.

⁶⁰ A1C V LaBoy, "Love at First Sight," Sunburst, page 8, 25 Apr 03, filed as SD 11-89, 49 FW Jan-Dec 03 Hist.

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Pages 32 through 116 redacted for the following reasons:


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**UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX F
PHOTO ARCHIVE**

**8 FS IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Feb-Apr 2003**

All Photographs are Unclassified
(Click to view larger images)

COL HUNT PRESS CONFERENCE—30 JAN 03



DEPLOYMENT—1 FEB 03




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**UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX F
PHOTO ARCHIVE (CON'T)**

All Photographs are Unclassified
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F-117 EMPLOYMENT-20 MARCH 03 AND BEYOND




LIFE IN QATAR



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RETURNING HOME – 14 APRIL 2004



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LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

<u>SD 001</u>	Rpt (S/REL REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [RAMM 01 MISREP (U)], 200638Z MAR03
<u>SD 002</u>	Rpt (S/REL REL USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [RAMM 02 MISREP (U)], 200615Z MAR03
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<u>SD 004</u>	Rpt (S/NF/DECL X3), 8EFS/IN, [BIMBO 42 MISREP (U)] 210044Z MAR 03
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<u>SD 015</u>	Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [POTENT 44 MISREP (U)] 221930Z MAR 03
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<u>SD 023</u>	Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [HOIST 42 MISREP (U)] 230610Z MAR 03
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<u>SD 095</u>	Rpt (S/NF/DECL X1), 8EFS/IN, [NOBEL 43 MISREP (U)] 032015Z APR 03
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<u>SD 100</u>	Rpt (S/DECL X1), ACC/DRY, "Mission Effectiveness Final Analysis: Air Force Surface to Air Missiles in Operation Iraqi Freedom (U)," 8 Jan 04
<u>SD 101</u>	Timeline (U), "Operation Iraqi Freedom Chronology," <i>Airman</i> , June 2003
<u>SD 102</u>	Timeline (U), "Iraq Timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004," <i>Guardian Unlimited</i> , 2004
<u>SD 103</u>	Spreadsheet (S/DECL X4), 8 FS/IN, "Mission Tracker (U)," 24 Jul 03
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<u>SD 138</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 27 March 2003 (U)," 27 Mar 03
<u>SD 139</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Intel Brief, 28 March 2003 (U)," 28 Mar 03
<u>SD 140</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 28 March 2003 (U)," 28 Mar 03
<u>SD 141</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 29 March 2003 (U)," 29 Mar 03

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<u>SD 142</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 31 March 2003 (U)," 31 Mar 03
<u>SD 143</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 1st Go 1 April 2003 (U)," 1 Apr 03
<u>SD 144</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 2nd Go 1 April 2003 (U)," 1 Apr 03
<u>SD 145</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 2 April 2003 (U)," 2 Apr 03
<u>SD 146</u>	Brfg (S/REL US, AUS, CAN, GBR/DECL X4), 8 EFS, "Combat Mission Brief, 3 April 2003 (U)," 3 Apr 03

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GLOSSARY

ACC	Air Combat Command
ADVON	Advanced Echelon
AFB	Air Force Base
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AMXS	Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ATO	Air Tasking Order
CENTCOM	Central Command
CEP	Circular Error Probable
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CTF	Combined Task Force
DMPI	Desired Mean Point of Impact
EGBU	Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit
ESTA	En route Support Team Aircraft
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FW	Fighter Wing
GBU	Guided Bomb Unit
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
LRS	Logistics Readiness Squadron
MC	Mission Capable
MSN	Mission
MXS	Maintenance Squadron
NMCB	Non Mission Capable, Both
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSW	Operation Southern Watch
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
RAM	Radar Absorbent Material
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TNMCM	Total Non Mission Capable, Maintenance
TNMCS	Total Non Mission Capable, Supply
TOT	Time On Target
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UN	United Nations
UTC	Unit Type Code
WRSK	War Reserve Supply Kit

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

MAR 08 2010

HQ ACC/A6
180 Benedict Avenue, Suite 210
Langley AFB VA 23665-1993

Mr. Jeffrey Richelson
401 S. Burnside Avenue, #8J
Los Angeles CA 90036

Dear Mr. Richelson

This is in response to your 13 October 2009 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a copy of the 49th Fighter Wing History, Black Sheep Over Iraq for the 8th Fighter Squadron in Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Portions of the history are releasable and attached. The redacted portions are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552(b)(1) and Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(a). Disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

If you decide to appeal our partial denial decision, write to the Secretary of the Air Force within 60 days from the date of this letter. If no appeal is received or if the appeal is postmarked after the conclusion of this 60-day period, the appeal may be considered closed. Include your reasons for reconsideration along with a copy of this letter. Mail to:

Secretary of the Air Force
Thru: HQ ACC/A6CK (FOIA)
180 Benedict Avenue, Suite 210
Langley AFB VA 23665-1993
acc.foia@acc.af.mil

Department of Defense Regulation 5400.7 indicates fees be assessed for processing this request; however, the fees are waived in this instance.

Sincerely


ARTHUR G. HATCHER, JR., Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Communications

Attachment:
Releasable Record

FOIA Case 2010-0292

Global Power For America